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mid-1990s. Three elements of the Korean industrial development and structural
change are discussed: 1) its outward orientation and export push, 2) its climb up the
ladder of comparative advantage, and 3) its economic management of the
industrialization effort. Finally, we reflect on the lessons from the Korean
experience.
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SOME LESSONS FROM KOREA'S INDUSTRIALIZATION
STRATEGYAND EXPERIENCE
It is almost with disbelief that we learn that in 1965, the general assessment of Korea by
the foreign-aid establishment was that it was "the hell-hole of foreign assistance", a
"bottomless pit" and a "hopeless case". That's according to a major economic adviser in the
design of Korea's Second Five Year Plan (Adelman 2007).[1]
By 1996, the year when Korea was admitted to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, a group to which only high-income countries can be a are
invited to be members, its Gross Domestic Product per head was US$16, 099, which marked
an increase of 6.6 times its corresponding level in 1970 of US$2,432. Both figures are at
constant 2005 prices, converted to have purchasing power parity.[2]
An independent Commission on Growth and Development (2008) identified 13 economic
"success stories", which have grown since 1950 at an average rate of at least 7% for 25 years
or longer. At that pace of expansion, an economy almost doubles in size every decade. And
Korea is one of those fast-growing economies.[3]
From 1960 to 1979, the nation grew on average by 8% yearly. During this period, it
implemented a targeted industrialization strategy focused on low-technology and light
industries. Aside from achieving sustained economic growth, it has also shown great ability to
recover from crises. After the 1979 oil shock, the nation rapidly recovered and regained an
average yearly growth of 8.8% from 1981 to the mid-1990s. During this period, it shifted to
support heavy industries oriented toward the export market.
In this brief essay on Korea's rapid economic growth, we focus our attention from the
1960s to the time when it joined the OECD in 1996, a period marked by its industrialization
drive and structural transformation. Our interest is on its strategy of export-driven
industrialization.
From experience, we know that one who goes through the literature on Korean economic
growth can easily get bogged down in the detailed twists and turns of its economic history. So
we have chosen in this essay to look at the forest, not the trees, and to present the broad
contours of its economic development. Our modest goal is to make the Korean growth
experience a matter of interest for the non-specialist on Korea, as well as for any reader with
an interest in development.
In the sections that follow, we will look at three selected ingredients of the Korean model
of industrialization, namely: 1) its outward orientation and export push, 2) its climb up the
ladder of comparative advantage, and 3) its economic management of the industrialization
effort. In the final segment, we reflect on the lessons from the Korean economic miracle.
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Outward Orientation and Export Push
An important element of Korea's industrialization strategy is its emphasis on
manufactured exports. Export targets were specified by product, market, and exporting firm.
As one practitioner remarked, the export figures "were the only statistics that could not be
faked" -- they were easily confirmable from bills of lading emanating from a single dominant
port and trade-partner country records (Noland and Pack 2005).
Exports were interpreted as a relatively clean measure of the relative competitiveness of
domestic producers -- local firms might be able to charge high prices in the small, protected
domestic market, but this was not possible in the global marketplace. The export orientation
and export metric provided a well-placed emphasis on performance in international markets
as a barometer of success (see Table 1).
Table 1: Timing of Shifts in Trade and Industrial Policy of Korea
1961-73 Initial export take-off
1973-79 Heavy and chemical industry drive: selective promotion
1980-90 Gradual trade liberalization and move to less selectivity
1990- Trade liberalization and high-tech exports
onwards
Source: adapted from World Bank (1993), in Weiss (2005), pp 3-4
For a nation to choose in the 1960s the path of the export push was to swim against the
tide of development consensus. Most of the developing world opted to attempt to build
industries that produced substitutes for imported products kept out of the domestic markets by
means of high tariffs and import restrictions. Hence, the sole focus of other nations was the
domestic market. However, Korea studied Japan's earlier and contemporary policy
experiences carefully and copied many of them (sometimes perhaps, even to its own
detriment). The nation regarded Japan as the 'pathfinding explorer' (Young 2006).
The nation has promoted exports since the mid-1960s through a number of channels. First,
the existing multiple exchange rate system was abolished, and the new unitary exchange rate
was set and then managed to support the production activities of local 'comparatively
advantageous' industries (Westphal 1990). Second, export subsidies and import concessions
linked to exports were put in place to achieve the nation’s export targets (OECD 2012) . Third,
free trade export promotion zones were established.[4]
Korea started its export push by focusing on manufactured exports of labor-intensive
technologically simple goods, such as clothing, footwear, processed food, sports goods, and
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toys. The nation began its export-led growth by means of a triangular trade with Japan, on
which it depended for the supply of intermediate and capital goods, and with the United
States, Korea's largest and main export market. With continued economic growth and
industrial catch-up, the export markets as well as industrial structure diversified. The
developing economies became increasingly important as export markets, while the nation
exported more heavy and chemical industry goods.
Climbing Up the Ladder of Comparative Advantage
In the 1960s, the government had identified labor-intensive manufactures as holding great
promise for exports, but export promotion did not target specific industries or firms when
providing incentives. It overcame the initial export pessimism ("Who would buy our
products?") and let comparative advantage operate and focused its efforts on labor-intensive
industries. It imported raw materials, intermediate inputs, and capital goods and used its
cheap, high-quality labor to produce exports such as clothing and footwear.
However, the government was well-aware that outward orientation by itself was not
enough to sustain growth. From the second half of the 1960s, it made concerted efforts to
move into higher value-added segments along the value chain by making complementary
investments in human capital and infrastructure. In pursuing industrial upgrading, the
government looked thoroughly into what had to be done to fill the missing links in the
domestic value chain and move up the quality ladder, and made conscious efforts to aim for
international competitiveness from the outset (see Table 2).
Table 2: Changing Composition of Selected Top Korean Exports (percent of total exports)
Rank 1965 1975 1985 1994
No.1 Textiles, clothing,
footwear 30.9%
Textiles, clothing,
footwear 43.9%
Textiles, clothing,
footwear 32.1%
Textiles, clothing,
footwear 22.7%
No.2 Food 17.5% Food 14.1% Electrical
machinery 7.2%
Electrical
machinery 20.8%
No.3 Wood & paper
products 11.1%
Electrical
machinery 6.4%
Communications
equipment 5.7%
Chemicals &
pharmaceuticals 7.1%
No.4 Non-electrical
machinery 1.5%
Wood & paper
products 5.6%
Food 4.4% Communications
equipment 6.7%
Source: adapted from UNCTAD (1996) table 33, in Weiss (2005), p 4
After exploiting its comparative advantage to develop labor-intensive industries industries
downstream, it sought to produce the intermediate inputs imported from foreign upstream
industries through the acquisition of technology, the development of human resources, and
the construction of optimal-scale plants aimed for the world markets. For example, in the
chemical-textile value chain, the nation systematically built the links backward from export
of textiles to production of synthetic fibers, to development of basic petrochemicals (see
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Table 3).
Although capacity underutilization turned out to be a major problem at the end of the
1970s, the heavy and chemical industry (HCI) drive provided the foundation of many of the
nation's leading industries, such as steel, shipbuilding, machinery, electronics, and
petrochemicals (see Table 4). It strengthened significantly backward and forward linkages
among these industries, as well as related industries such as automobiles, to increase the local
content of exports (Lim 2011). It also enabled the nation to develop its own defense industry.
Economic Management of the Industrialization Effort
The industrialization drive requires quite a considerable effort from the government and
industry. Initiating the industrial take-off and then coordinating to ensure that the push to
industrialize be sustained requires both planning and continued monitoring of the economy.
In Korea, the government body that was responsible for the planning and coordination effort
was the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which was created in 1961. As one scholar of
Korean public administration puts it, "it is hard to imagine the successful economic
development of South Korea without the EPB" (Choi 2014). It occupied the center of the
nation's economic policy making and coordination structure, and had a great deal of control
over other economic ministries and agencies.
The EPB was like a "super-ministry" equipped with strategic functions, such as
development planning, national budget management, and management of aid, foreign capital
(borrowing), and technology. Moreover, its head was given the rank of deputy prime minister,
and he chaired the Economic Ministers' Council and directly reported to the president. It was
in existence for 33 years before being suddenly dissolved in 1994.[5]
A major policy instrument in the industrial strategy have been the five-year economic
plans. From 1962 to 1992, the government had formulated and implemented seven Five Year
Plans for Economic Development, which set targets and allocated resources to achieve the
objectives of industrial transformation and export-led growth. The five-year plans supported
the creation of domestic capabilities by orchestrating action across several fields, such as
industry and technology, trade, education and infrastructure.
The five-year plans sought national agreement on the direction of medium- and
long-term policies by harmonizing various views from different segments of society. Usually,
individual government ministries and agencies designed their own goals and strategies within
the realm of their own mandates, and the EPB took the role of social planner by coordinating
those plans and thereby designing a final comprehensive plan that was coherent at the
national level.
In the earlier phases of Korean economic development, the government took the leading
role in formulating the five-year plans. The major issues of the plans were sector investments
and mobilization of domestic and foreign capital to finance such investments. Each of the
five-year plans identified key objectives, introduced selective policies and directed resources
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Table 3: Key Features of Industrial Policy in Korea
Period Priority Activities Main Instruments
1960-73 Exports in general - key sectors
labor-intensive manufactures
Import protection, export subsidies
including duty drawbacks, credit
allocations, export targeting
1973-79 Heavy and chemical industries -
Priority sector steel, petrochemicals,
nonferrous metals, shipbuilding,
electronics and machinery;
Priority firms selected large
enterprises
Same as above, plus:
Widespread use of policy loans to
channel funds to priority firms and
sectors. Investment incentives through
tax credits.
1980-90 Manufactured exports, firms needed
restructuring, small and medium
enterprises. High technology
activities now priority.
Phased import liberalization, ending of
policy loans. Still government influence
over allocation of credit. Investment
incentives for R& D. Easing of
restrictions on FDI.
1990-
onwards
Private sector-led development;
restructuring of 'chaebol' after 1997
Crisis.
Financial sector liberalization; open
capital account
Source: adapted from Kim and Leipziger (1997), in Weiss (2005), p19
Table 4: Industrial Policy Objectives of Korea
Deepening Industrial Structure Strong push into capital-, skill- and
technology-intensive industry, especially heavy
intermediates and capital goods
Raising Local Content Stringent local content rules, creating support
industries, protection of local suppliers,
sub-contracting promotion
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Strategy FDI kept out unless necessary for technology
access or exports, joint ventures and licensing
encouraged
Raising Technological Effort Ambitious local R&D in advanced industry,
heavy investment in technology infrastructure.
Targeting of strategic technologies
Promotion of Large Local Enterprises Sustained drive to create giant private
conglomerates ('chaebol') to internalize markets,
lead heavy industry, create export brands
Source: Lall (2004), Table 2
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to achieve them. As the economy grew and the economic structures became more complex,
the government-led economic development strategy became less effective (see Table 5).
Hence, since the 1980s, the five-year plan has evolved from a "directive" into an
"indicative" plan that respects the initiative and the creativity of the private sector. The plans
implemented in earlier years focused on expanding the productive capacity and mobilizing
the required resources, whereas in later years, industrial rationalization and macroeconomic
stabilization aimed to make the economy more efficient and productive.
Table 5: Development Regimes and Seven Five-Year Economic Plans in Korea
Development
regimes
Government-led
industrialization
1962--
Government-led
industrialization
1982--
Transforming to
market-led growth
1993--
Major plans Five-year plans
(First to Fourth)
Five-year plans
(Fifth to Sixth)
'New economy' plan
(Seventh)
Key features of plans Mobilization and
allocation of national
resources
Rationalization and
restructuring
Private sector's
participation in
government's
planning
Focus of government
policies
Export promotion,
Heavy-chemical
industries drive
Strengthening
industrial
competitiveness
Internationalization
and economic
liberalization
Key targets of fiscal
policies
Supporting
industrialization,
Strengthening
defense capabilities
Restoring fiscal
prudence, Priorities
on education and
social welfare
Strengthening
industrial
competitiveness,
Priorities on
economic sectors
Source: adapted from Suh (2007), p29
Lessons from the "Miracle on the Han River"
Korea's economic miracle is referred to at times as the "Miracle on the Han River". The
phrase refers to the river which flows through the capital, Seoul, and the allusion is to an
earlier, impressive rebirth of a country similarly devastated by a war, in this case the Second
World War, namely the West German economy, the "Miracle on the Rhine". What lessons can
we draw from Korea's industrialization experience?
Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) made the observation that, because of Korea's rapid
economic growth, any big idea in development economics had to encompass Korea before it
could become conventional wisdom:
"Was Korea outward oriented or protectionist? Export promotion policy suggested
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outward oriented, while import protection suggested protectionist. Was Korea
government-led or market-friendly? Examination of the mechanics of government
direction of the economy suggested government-led; the use of the private sector as the
instrument of investment and the role of business councils suggested market-friendly.
Was Korea's growth Big Push or private sector- and productivity-led? This issue sparked
generations of debate about Korea's total factor productivity (TFP). . .Those who argued
that Korea proved that Big Push accumulation can lead to rapid growth tended to stress a
low TFP, while those who emphasized the private sector role found a high TFP. Even
when it was agreed that the Korean government intervened in growth, the question arose
of whether that intervention was rules-based or discretionary. . ." (pp.15-6)
As the authors point out, these debates were often less about what Korea actually did than
about what label to apply to Korea and then sell to other nations eager to emulate Korea's
success.
In a similar vein, though referring to East Asia -- but which applies to Korea as well --
Rodrik (1999) notes that the region has long served as the "Rorschach test" for economists.
Observers with a favorable take on industrial policy saw in it a confirmation of their theories
on the importance of state intervention. Free market advocates saw instead the triumph of
small government. Trade economists viewed it as a miracle based on outward orientation,
labor economists stressed the early emphasis on education, and macroeconomists pointed to
its fiscal conservatism. Growth theorists debated the respective contributions of human
capital, physical capital, and technology adoption.
In the debate on the role of state intervention, there are those who argue, that for all of the
apparent government intervention, Korea's economic polices were market-conforming.
Industrial targeting and foreign trade interventions canceled each other out in ways that made
Korea behave much like a liberalized economy. As we showed above in our brief overview of
Korean economic growth, as per capita income grew and the complexity of the economy
increased, government responded by withdrawing from many of its specific targeted
interventions in favor of more general macro controls over the economy.
As Perkins (1997) notes, all sides of the major controversies surrounding Korea's
economic growth have, in a sense, been partly correct. But no single view is correct for all
periods of Korea's development experience. The Korean economy and economic policy in the
first half of the 1990s was very different from what it was in the 1960s and 1970s.
At the start of this essay we made mention of the Growth Commission's selection of 13
economic "success stories". The object of the exercise by the commission was to find the
common ingredients of these economies, and five "striking points of resemblance" are listed.
One of the five points is that they let markets allocate resources.[6] As a Korean economist
commented, "conspicuously missing from the list is the use of nonmarket measures to
coordinate productive activities, facilitate industrial upgrading and innovation, and cope with
external shocks" (Lim 2011). However, in fairness to the commission, it did include the point
that these economies had committed, credible, and capable governments.
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Table 6: Timeline of Selected Events in the Korean Economy
1945 Liberation from Japanese colonial rule
1948 Establishment of Republic of Korea
1950-53 Korean war
1960-65 Announcement of first major step in trade policy reform and
continuous expansion of export incentives
1961 Nationalization of commercial banks
1964 Major devaluation of won, the domestic currency
1965 Unification of exchange rates; move to positive real interest rate for
commercial banks
1967 Korea joins the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);
import regime is liberalized by switching from positive list to negative
list system
1972 First domestic debt crisis; presidential emergency decree places a
three-year moratorium on the payment of corporate debts to
curb-market lenders
1973 Government launches a heavy and chemical industry (HCI) drive
1979 Government announces 'comprehensive stabilization program', which
ends the HCI drive
1980 Major devaluation of the won; further trade liberalization, including
multi-year tariff reduction plan
1980s "Rationalization" of industries in financial troubles
1983 Privatization of commercial banks
1988 Interest rate deregulation begins
1989 Piecemeal liberalization of international financial transactions begins,
including a more market-determined exchange rate
1993 Government announces "new economy 100 days plan"
1994 Korea "graduated" from being a recipient of World Bank borrowing
1996 Korea joins OECD in December; commitments to financial
liberalization are made
Source: adapted from Krueger and Yoo (2002) and Devieux (2013)
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Footnotes (refers to the numbers inside [ ] in the main text):
1. The said Second Five Year Plan had a number of foreign "primary advisers": Bela
Balassa and Margaret Musgrave on trade reform; Richard Musgrave on tax reform; Edward
Shaw, John Gurley and Hugh Patrick on monetary policy, in addition to Irma Adelman on
planning techniques (Adelman 1999, p70).
2. The 1970 data are the earliest year available for Korea at the OECD online statistical
database.
3. The other 12 economic "success stories" are (by region): Africa--Botswana; Latin
America--Brazil; Middle East--Oman; Europe--Malta; and East Asia--China, Indonesia, Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
4. The government established in 1970 the first free trade zone (FTZ) in Masan. This
special zone provided an industrial estate where land, utilities, transport facilities, and even
buildings were supplied by the government at highly-subsidized rates. The FTZ also allowed
the duty-free entry of goods destined for re-export. A second zone was put up in Iri in 1973
(Nicolas et al. 2013).
5. The EPB and the Ministry of Finance were merged in 1994 into the Ministry of Finance
and Economics, which was later separated in 1999 into the Ministry of Planning and Budget
and the Ministry of Finance. In 2008, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance was formed by
combining both functions.
6. The other four "striking points of resemblance" of the 13 economic "success stories" are:
1) they fully explointed the world economy; 2) they maintained macroeconomic stability; 3)
they mustered high rates of saving and investment; and 4) they had committed, credible, and
capable governments.
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